Jacques Derrida, Signéponge/Signeponge//1975, Subject, Object, Thing
Jacques Derrida Algerian-born French scholar, known for cultivating a pattern of semiotic critique known as deconstruction, which he addressed in various texts, and explained in the meaning of phenomenology. One of the significant personalities correlated with postmodern and post-structuralism philosophy.
[…] ‘[the poet] Francis ponge will be my thing ‘ should give us a possibility to test out the source of the thing.No lasting simply the Natura Rerum, about which he speaks about very thoroughly to us, but the order of the subject, not the system which dictates the order of things, the one which theories and psychology know, but the precarious law. i speak of a law prescribed, as in the first character, by the thing, with an obstinate austerity; as an inflexible command, this mastery is also an unsatisfied desire: it forbids the one who formulates and communicates under this method solely, in the circumstances of comprehensive heteronomy in homage to the thing.
Voracious, yes, and insaturable, a situation i insist on since it also includes thirst and the water. He nevermore has sufficient. Neither of water nor of thirst.
In the inequality of this heteronomy, passionate concerns itself within two equities, struggle to end whose bed earth, actual or thing will always sketch out the pattern in the pre of the document in the hole.
This engagement which sets into action the life and faith of the name, asks for some arbitrators and spectators. We shall solicit them out.
Several a Podnerostoy has been placed to practice in the so-called enigma of anthropomorphism. Does Ponge respond to the thing itself? Is Ponge a phenomenologist? On the contrast, does he forecast human purposes onto things? or add more complex alternatives, which nevertheless change in the corresponding groove. He himself has acknowledged to all those. problems, it answers to go there, to recognise and to understand – what he said for instance, to an American scholastic, stubbornly.
What to drive knowledge has been misinterpreted, and whichever the whole course of anthropomorphism was assuredly intended to evade or reject (and he has regularly been in conjunction with it), is possibly the grasping: for him, the thing is not something you have to write, expose or describe, by seeking inside it or within individually, according to the alternating circuit of the pattern. It is this too, sufficiently and absolutely so and therefore there mounts the just confusion. But not simply or in the first position. The thing is not something corresponding to laws that I discuss objectively or subjectively on the contrary. Previously the thing is the additional, fully other which writes the law or which delivers, law which is utterly not natural [lex nature rerum] , although a remarkably, insatiably autocratic injunction to which i ought to subject my oneself, yet when this includes seeking to conduct myself later, at the edge of engagement, having endeavoured it, with my life and ambition, something similar to my impression. we will come to this next; this dictate, this dedication can claim the muteness of the thing. it provides direction while lingering silent.
The duel and the legacy carry on to death. the thing persists another whose laws necessitate the absurd. It does not oblige this thing or that, something which could transform out to be unmanageable. No, it obliges the unmanageable and commands it because it is impossible and because this rather futility is the state of the occurrence of a need […]