On subject and Object//1969, Theodor W. Adorno, Documents of Contemporary Art
On subject and Object
The difference between the subject and the object is divided by both subjects and through the object. It can not be more absolute than it can be eliminated from thought. In reality, anything in the subject can be attributed to the object. Everything in it is not an object, “is” it opens semantically. Traditional epistemology’s pure subjective form, according to one’s own theory, is always the only form of something objective, never without that objectivity, or even imagining without it.
The strength of the epistemological ego, the identity of self-awareness is evidently registered after the permanent, twin object; Kant fundamentally relied on this, He was not able to claim that the subjective forms are the restraints of objectivity if he had not tactically allowed them objectivity obtained from the one to which he distinguishes the subject.
However, at the limit where subjectivity contracts from the single point of its artificial uniformity. what is held together is forever only what in itself fits together nevertheless. Otherwise, the integration would be a mere superficial classification. of course, without the subjective code of integration, such a belonging collectively is just as impossible. Notwithstanding the subjective and a presumptive can be considered to have objective gravity only in so far as it has an objective view. without it, the object developed by the priori would be a real tautology for the subject. Definitely by the feature of its being enduring, given and extrinsic to the subject and contents related to it, what Kant describes as the matter of perception, is likewise something objective in the subject. Therefore, it is easy to think of the subject as nothing and of the object as independent, a bent not far away from thoughts of Hegel’s. But this is again a wonderful illusion.
The subject is diminished to nothing within his hypostasis composing something out of nothingness. The hypostasis faults because it cannot justify the deepest, naive-practical foundation of being. The Idealist development of the subject originators on its erroneously fascinating subject to be objective in the sense of something being-in-itself, exactly what is not: contained upon the patterns of things, the subject is doomed to nothing. the subject is all the extra the limited it is and all the limited the extra it considers itself to breathe, to be for itself something as objective. As an indispensable time, nevertheless, it is kind of ineradicable. In the exclusion of the subjective flash, the object would come apart diffusely like the flying stirrings and twinkling of subjective life.
Object, though weakened, also is not outwardly subject. If the object itself needed subject as a while, then its objectivity would become nonsense. This is conspicuously offensive in the vulnerability of epistemology of Hume. It was subjectivity turned yet believing it could enforce with the subject. Since it is essential to judge the association between original and intellectual subject. The original subject, as has been declared since Kant in the infinite variations, is a fundamental element of the observational world. its purpose through it’s a competency for direct observation-which intellectual subject requires, for no genuinely legitimate thing could have any sort of contact – is in fact much more constitutive than the role idealism acquired to the intellectual subject, which is itself an extremely, a pre-critically attributed real identity to the abstraction of personal awareness.
Nonetheless, the purpose of the original is a hint that thinking, by the capacity of its own inherent factors of generalisation. The contradiction between universal and singular is essential as well as illusory. One can not survive without the other, the singular only as determined and therefore universal. The universal only as of the resolution of a singular and thus itself distinct. Both of them and are and are not. This is one of the influential reasons for a non-idealist dialectics.